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I.

INTRODUCTION

1

In State v. Carter, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered
whether a drug-detection dog sniff of a fenced-in storage unit was a
search under either the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
2
Constitution or article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution.
Although the court ruled that a drug-detection dog sniff outside a
storage unit was not a search under the Fourth Amendment, it was
a search within the meaning of article I, section 10 of the
3
Minnesota Constitution. To justify such a search, the police must
“have at least [a] reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
4
activity” before conducting the sniff.
This Article argues that Carter is an important decision for six
primary reasons. First, Carter recognized that the protections
against governmental intrusions are greater under the Minnesota
Constitution than the protections afforded by the U.S.
5
Constitution. Second, the court in Carter held that a dog sniff of a
storage unit is not a search under the Fourth Amendment—an
6
issue not yet decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. Third, Carter
concluded that a dog sniff of a storage unit is a search under article
I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution, declining to follow the
U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis that focuses almost exclusively on
7
the nature of the item sought. Fourth, the court refused to extend
8
Kyllo v. United States, which concerned the use of a thermal-imaging
9
device on a home, to dog sniffs. Fifth, the court decided that the
10
“plain smell” doctrine does not apply to odors detected by dogs.
Sixth, the court signaled that the potential for “false alerts” from
drug-detection dogs is a consideration in determining the

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

697 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 2005).
Id. at 202.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 210-11.
Id. at 208-09.
Id. at 210-11.
533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 207-08.
Id. at 211.
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constitutionality of this type of investigation.
The decision in
Carter sets clear limits on government intrusions—not only on the
unrestrained and suspicionless use of drug-detecting dogs, but also
on other emerging law enforcement investigative techniques as
well.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Facts
On June 10, 2002, police deployed a canine unit to conduct a
dog sniff of a bank of storage units located inside a fenced-in St.
12
The dog indicated the presence of a
Paul storage facility.
13
controlled substance in a unit rented by Andre Carter.
Based in large part on the dog sniff, police applied for a
14
The search warrant
warrant to search Carter’s storage unit.
application noted that “approximately” four weeks before the dog
sniff was conducted, a Minnesota Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension (“BCA”) agent, dressed in “raid gear” and staging
for an operation near the storage facility, observed a white car drive
15
into the storage facility. Shortly thereafter, the white car left the
16
facility, then re-entered as the driver “stared” at the agent. Then
the white car left the facility at the same time as a blue sports-utility
17
vehicle.
The blue vehicle was registered to Carter’s brother,
18
The BCA agent believed this activity to be
Benjamin Carter.
suspicious, hypothesizing that the driver of the white car was
19
“scouting or surveying the officers.”
The BCA agent informed a St. Paul police officer of his

11. Id. at 210.
12. Id. at 203.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. As the court noted, the search warrants themselves do not indicate
that the vehicles entered and departed the facility at the same time. See id. at 203
n.1; see also Application in Support of Search Warrant (on file with authors).
During the suppression hearing before the trial court, the affiant officer testified
that he was told by the BCA agent that the vehicles left the facility together. Carter,
697 N.W.2d at 203 n.1.
18. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 203.
19. Id.
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20

observations at the storage facility.
Recognizing Benjamin
Carter’s name from a drug-related investigation, the officer
consulted with the manager of the storage facility who told him
that Carter and his brother, Benjamin Carter, “each rented two
units in the facility and sometimes visited their units several times a
21
day.” The officer then arranged for the canine unit, “apparently
after securing permission from the facility’s management to enter
22
the fenced area immediately outside of [Carter’s] unit.”
In addition to the dog sniff, the BCA agent’s observations, and
the storage facility manager’s comments, the warrant application
alleged the following information:
• Carter and his brother were members of a gang;
• Carter had two prior drug convictions in 1995 and 1997;
• Carter’s brother Benjamin had a prior drug conviction
from 1995;
• Carter had been convicted of possession of a pistol
without a permit in 1995; and
• Carter had three previous arrests, none of which
23
resulted in convictions, in 1994 and 1998.
The warrant application did not identify the facility manager
who assisted the officer, or specify the date on which the police
24
made contact with him or her. The application did not indicate
25
when the BCA agent made his observations at the facility. Nor did
the application reveal why there was a four-week time period
26
between the BCA agent’s observations and the dog sniff.
When the police executed the search warrant, they found two
27
firearms inside Carter’s storage unit. There were no drugs in the

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. In fact, the record does not indicate how the police gained access to
the facility to conduct the dog sniff. The storage facility was a “fenced area with
rows . . . [of] different sized garages that people may rent to store various items.”
Transcript of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Hearing, State v. Carter (Mar. 12,
2003) (on file with authors). The entire storage facility was gated and locked to
prevent entry, and required a pass or code to enter. See id. When the police
executed the search warrant, they had to show the manager, who allowed the
police to enter and directed them to Carter’s unit, the warrant in order to gain
access into the storage area. See id.
23. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 203.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 204.
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B. Procedural History
Carter was charged with the offense of felon in possession of a
firearm under Minnesota Statutes section 624.713, subdivisions
29
1(b) and 2, and section 609.11, subdivision 5(b). After pleading
not guilty, Carter moved to suppress the evidence found pursuant
to the search on the ground that without the results of the dog
sniff, the application in support of the warrant failed to establish
30
The trial court denied Carter’s motion to
probable cause.
suppress, concluding that the affidavit presented a “substantial
31
basis” for probable cause to support a search warrant. The jury
found Carter guilty of possession of a firearm by an ineligible
person, and the trial court sentenced him to a sixty-month term of
32
imprisonment.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals, in a published opinion
33
written by Judge Crippen, affirmed the district court’s denial of
34
Carter
Carter’s motion to suppress and Carter’s conviction.
35
appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
36
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.
The court first concluded that without the results of the dog sniff,
37
the warrant application failed to establish probable cause. Then,
the court determined that under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, a
dog sniff outside a storage unit is not a search under the Fourth
38
Amendment. But the court found that that the dog sniff was a
search within the meaning of article I, section 10 of the Minnesota

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. The sixty-month sentence was the mandatory minimum sentence for
the offense of felon in possession of a firearm. MINN. STAT. § 609.11, subd. 5(b)
(2004).
33. Justice Barry G. Anderson was also on the court of appeals panel. Justice
Anderson was subsequently appointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court. Because
of his participation in the court of appeals decision, he recused himself from
consideration of the case before the Minnesota Supreme Court.
34. State v. Carter, 682 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
35. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 202.
36. Id. at 212.
37. Id. at 206.
38. Id. at 209.
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39

Constitution. Adopting a standard articulated by the Pennsylvania
40
Supreme Court, the court held that police must have a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity before
conducting a dog sniff and must be lawfully present in the place
41
where the dog sniff occurs.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
In affirming Carter’s conviction, the court of appeals found no
precedent requiring the police to have a reasonable and articulable
suspicion of criminal activity to justify a dog sniff under the Fourth
Amendment. The court began its analysis by noting the unique
42
place dog sniffs occupy in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In
United States v. Place, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a brief
detention and dog sniff of luggage in an airport where police had a
reasonable suspicion that the luggage contained narcotics did not
constitute a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth
43
Amendment. Citing Place, the court of appeals noted that dog
44
sniffs are limited both in manner and in scope. Thus, the court
concluded, because a dog sniff “discloses only the presence or
absence of narcotics, a contraband item,” it does not constitute a
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment—at least in
45
public places.
46
The court of appeals acknowledged that in State v. Wiegand,
the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized “that there exists a
higher reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s home than in
47
public places.” But the court declined to extend Wiegand to dog
sniffs of enclosed storage units, determining that Wiegand’s holding
“is confined to a case where law enforcement attempts to expand
the scope or duration of an investigative stop beyond the
investigation of an equipment violation that was the cause for the
48
stop.” Without precedent establishing a “universal requirement
that dog sniffs be limited to cases where a reasonable, articulable
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 211.
Commonwealth v. Johnston, 530 A.2d 74, 77-79 (Pa. 1987).
Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 212.
State v. Carter, 682 N.W.2d 648, 651 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
462 U.S. 696, 698 (1983).
Carter, 682 N.W.2d at 651.
Id. (quoting Place, 462 U.S. at 707).
645 N.W.2d 125 (Minn. 2002).
Carter, 682 N.W.2d at 651.
Id. at 652.
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suspicion of criminal activity is shown,” the court examined
whether Carter had a reasonable expectation of privacy “in the area
49
outside his storage unit where the dog sniff occurred.” Finding
that individuals with access to the storage facility were not restricted
from the area where the dog sniff occurred, the court concluded
that Carter had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the “semi50
public area surrounding the entrance to [his] storage unit.”
51
Finally, citing Kyllo v. United States, the court noted the
existence of “broader limits to the use of unique detection devices
52
that reveal certain information about the contents of a structure.”
But under the circumstances of the Carter case, “where (1) there is
no intrusion inside a building; (2) it is not asserted that the
structure at issue is part of a home; and (3) no question is raised as
to the legitimacy of the police presence near the structure,” the
court found no authority recognizing a legitimate expectation of
53
privacy.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
1. Without the Dog Sniff, the Remaining Statements in the Warrant
Failed to Establish a Substantial Basis for Probable Cause
The Minnesota Supreme Court first considered whether,
excluding the dog sniff, the remaining allegations in the search
54
warrant application established probable cause. If independent
probable cause existed, the court did not need to decide the
55
constitutionality of the dog sniff.
The court concluded that, under the totality of the
circumstances, the three factors in the warrant application other
than the dog sniff—Carter’s criminal record, the BCA agent’s
observations, and the manager’s statement—were insufficient to

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Carter, 682 N.W.2d at 652.
Id.
State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 204-06 (Minn. 2005).
Id. at 204.
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support the issuance of the warrant for the storage unit. While a
person’s criminal record may be properly considered by an issuing
judge upon an application for a search warrant as “corroborative
evidence,” Carter’s convictions were several years old and thus “less
reliable in providing a ‘fair probability’ that contraband will be
57
found in a place to be searched.”
As to the BCA agent’s observations at the storage facility, the
court noted that the fact that the two cars entered or left the facility
together was not part of the warrant application, and therefore
58
irrelevant to the court’s analysis.
Moreover, the fact that the
driver was staring at the officers “can be innocently explained by
59
the unusual experience of seeing police officers in ‘raid gear.’”
And Carter’s “mere association” with his brother, whose car the
BCA agent observed, could not provide probable cause because
“there was no nexus linking the suspicious vehicles or their drivers
60
to any criminal activity involving [Carter].”
Finally, the court determined that it was unclear whether the
manager’s statements were sufficiently fresh, given that the warrant
application failed to state when the manager provided the
information, not to mention the application’s failure to explain the
four-week gap between the BCA agent’s observations and the
61
request for a warrant. Without the results of the dog sniff, there
was no “direct connection” to the storage unit, and thus there was
no substantial basis for probable cause to issue the search warrant
62
for Carter’s storage unit.
2. A Dog Sniff Outside a Storage Unit Is Not a Search Under the
Fourth Amendment
Next, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether a dog
sniff outside a storage unit is a search under the Fourth
63
Amendment. The court noted that “[w]hat a person knowingly
56. Id. at 206.
57. Id. at 205.
58. Id. at 205-06.
59. Id. at 206 n.3.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 206. The court also observed that “there may be many legitimate
reasons to visit a storage unit frequently. Without more, the mere fact of frequent
visits to a storage unit does not provide evidence of the ‘fair probability’ that
contraband is inside.” Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 206.
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exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
64
Then, the court
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”
discussed Place’s holding that “because a traveler’s expectation of
privacy in a public airport is limited, and a trained drug-detection
dog sniff is only minimally intrusive, a dog sniff of a traveler’s
luggage in a public place was not a search under the Fourth
65
Amendment.”
The distinction in Place, the court noted, was
between a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the
contents of luggage, but not in scents detectable outside the
66
luggage.
Regarding the intrusiveness of a dog sniff, the court again
relied on Place’s discussion of the sui generis nature of a dog sniff
and the observation that there is “no other investigative procedure
that is so limited both in the manner in which the information is
obtained and in the content of the information revealed by the
67
procedure.”
68
The court rejected the argument that Kyllo v. United States
overruled the dog sniff rule established in City of Indianapolis v.
69
70
Edmond and Place.
As it had previously observed in State v.
Wiegand—a case involving a dog sniff of a car during a stop for a
routine equipment violation—the court noted that “a thermal
imager is ‘a piece of technical equipment much different from a
71
dog.’” Moreover, the court distinguished Kyllo because it involved
72
the heightened expectations of a home. The court also cited the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Illinois v. Caballes, which
73
similarly involved a dog sniff of a car. In Caballes, the Supreme
Court reiterated that a dog sniff is minimally intrusive and does not
implicate legitimate privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment

64. Id. at 207 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)).
68. 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that warrantless use of a thermal-imaging
device on a home was an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment).
69. 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000) (holding that a dog sniff of a vehicle at a traffic
checkpoint is not a search because it “does not require entry into the car and is
not designed to disclose any information other than the presence or absence of
narcotics”).
70. 462 U.S. at 707; see supra text accompanying note 65.
71. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 207 (quoting State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 130
(Minn. 2002)).
72. Id. at 208.
73. 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
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because it “does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise
74
Under the Fourth
would remain hidden from public view.”
Amendment, then, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that
Kyllo is consistent with Place and Edmond because
while a heat-sensory device is “capable of detecting lawful
activity” inside a house, a dog sniff “reveals no information
other than the location of a substance that no individual
has any right to possess.” The [Supreme] Court clarified
that the relevant inquiry is whether the investigative
device used is capable of detecting lawful as well as
unlawful activity inside a place that otherwise carries a
75
legitimate expectation of privacy.
While the expectation of privacy in a storage unit may be
greater than the privacy interest in a car, the court concluded that
the privacy interest in a storage unit is less than that for a home
76
Under Kyllo and Caballes, “the
under the Fourth Amendment.
unit is not a place where a person seeks refuge or conducts
77
Thus, the Minnesota Supreme
frequent personal activities.”
Court concluded that a drug-detection dog sniff in the area
immediately surrounding a storage unit does not constitute a
78
search under the Fourth Amendment.
3. A Dog Sniff Outside a Storage Unit Is a Search Under the
Minnesota Constitution
In contrast to its Fourth Amendment analysis, the court
concluded that the definition of a search is broader under article I,
79
section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution. The court looked to
decisions from Pennsylvania and Alaska; both jurisdictions had
determined that a dog sniff of a storage unit, while not a search
under the Fourth Amendment, was a search under their respective
80
state constitutions. The court noted that the Pennsylvania and

74. Id. at 409 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S 696, 707 (1983)).
75. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 208 (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409).
76. Id. at 209.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Article I, section 10 is textually identical to the Fourth Amendment.
Therefore, U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment are
of “inherently persuasive, although not necessarily compelling, force.” Id. at 210
(quoting State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 132 (Minn. 2002)).
80. Id. at 210 (citing McGahan v. State, 807 P.2d 506, 510 (Alaska Ct. App.
1991); Commonwealth v. Johnston, 530 A.2d 74, 78-79 (Pa. 1987)).
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Alaska decisions relied in part on Professor Wayne R. LaFave, “who
cautions against ‘totally unrestrained’ use of dogs in law
enforcement because of the growing recognition that dogs can
81
provide ‘false alerts.’” Considering both the privacy expectation
in storage units and the intrusiveness of drug-detection dog sniffs
outside a storage unit, the court concluded that “there are good
reasons to guard against a police officer’s random use of a drugdetection dog to sniff in the area immediately outside of a person’s
storage unit, absent some level of suspicion of drug-related
82
activity.”
The court determined that a person’s expectation of privacy in
a storage unit is greater under the Minnesota Constitution than
under the Fourth Amendment, particularly where the storage unit
is “equivalent in size to a garage and . . . large enough to contain a
significant number of personal items and even to conduct some
83
personal activities.” Unlike a car or luggage, the very purpose of a
84
storage unit “is to store personal effects in a fixed location.” A
renter of a storage unit has no expectation of privacy in that which
can be smelled plainly or seen from the “area immediately outside
85
the unit.” In fact, while a renter should expect that other people
may lawfully be present outside the unit, he “need not expect that
police will be able to bring to that area drug-detecting dogs that
86
can detect odors that no person could detect.”
Thus, the court concluded that a drug-detection dog outside
Carter’s storage unit was a search under the Minnesota
87
Constitution.
4.

What Level of Suspicion Is Required?

To determine what level of suspicion is required before police
may conduct a dog sniff of a storage unit, the Carter court returned
88
Adopting the
to decisions by Pennsylvania and Alaska courts.
81. Id. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.2(g) (4th ed.
2004) (discussing and compiling various cases on the use of drug-detection dogs
and the policy rationales underlying their current treatment by those courts).
82. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 210.
83. Id. at 211.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 211; see McGahan v. State, 807 P.2d 506, 510-11 (Alaska Ct. App.
1991) (“Alaska’s more stringent protection of its citizens’ privacy interests can still
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ruling of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in pertinent part, the
court found the reasonable suspicion standard to be a “workable
constitutional ‘middle ground’ that balances a person’s expectation
of privacy against the government’s interest in using dogs to detect
89
illegal drugs.”
Further embracing the Pennsylvania court’s
rationale in Commonwealth v. Johnston, the Minnesota Supreme
Court noted that
[o]n the one hand, much of the law enforcement utility of
such dogs would be lost if full blown warrant procedures
were required before a canine sniff could be used; but on
the other, it is our view that a free society will not remain
free if police may use this, or any other crime detection
90
device, at random and without reason.
Recognizing the government’s significant law-enforcement
interest in using dogs to detect drugs, the court adopted the
holding of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Johnston:
[A] narcotics detection dog may be deployed to test for
the presence of narcotics [in the area outside a storage
unit] where:
1. the police are able to articulate reasonable grounds for
believing that drugs may be present in the place they seek
to test; and
2. the police are lawfully present in the place where the
91
canine sniff is conducted.
Applying this rule, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded
that the police did not have a reasonable suspicion that drugs were
present in Carter’s storage unit and therefore the dog sniff was an
92
unreasonable search under the Minnesota Constitution.
Accordingly, the evidence discovered as a result of the dog sniff
and seized during the subsequent search of the storage unit was
93
unlawfully obtained and should have been suppressed. The court

be assured if the reasonable suspicion standard is applied to canine searches of
areas of public access exterior to commercial buildings.”); Commonwealth v.
Johnston, 530 A.2d 74, 79 (Pa. 1987) (“[R]equiring police officers to articulate
‘reasonable grounds’ before undertaking a dog-sniff of a storage unit presents a
workable constitutional ‘middle ground’ that balances a person’s expectation of
privacy against the government’s interest in using dogs to detect illegal drugs.”).
89. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 211 (quoting Johnston, 530 A.2d at 79).
90. Id. (quoting Johnston, 530 A.2d at 79).
91. Id. at 212 (quoting Johnston, 530 A.2d at 79).
92. Id.
93. Id.
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94

reversed Carter’s conviction and remanded for a new trial.
B. The Special Concurrence of Justice Page

95

Justice Page concurred in the result, but disagreed with the
majority’s holding that reasonable, articulable suspicion is the
96
proper standard in dog sniff cases.
In Justice Page’s view, the
privacy interest in a storage unit within a secure facility is greater
than the privacy interest in an automobile, and “[g]iven this more
prominent privacy interest, a search warrant based on anything less
than probable cause impermissibly erodes the protections of article
97
I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution.”
Justice Page articulated this position previously—and more
fully—in his concurrence and special concurrence in State v.
98
Wiegand. There, Justice Page first disagreed with the intrusiveness
analysis employed by the U.S. Supreme Court and the Wiegand
majority, concluding that “the level of intrusion resulting from a
dog sniff is significant and requires probable cause before the
99
intrusion is permissible.” According to Justice Page, when police
use dogs, “they are investigating.
They are trying to find
100
something. They are seeking evidence in hidden places.”
“The
dog is detecting something about the person that is not otherwise
101
apparent on observation.”
In addition, Justice Page was persuaded by Kyllo’s command
that “[t]he Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never
been tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of information
102
obtained.” Justice Page noted that what is detected fails to make
the search any more or less reasonable, particularly in light of
advances in technology that enable an officer to “conduct a search
103
that detects only criminal activity.”
“[T]he intrusion is complete

94. Id. at 212.
95. Chief Justice Blatz joined in Justice Page’s special concurrence.
96. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 212 (Page, J., concurring).
97. Id. (citing State v. Pietraszewski, 285 Minn. 212, 216, 172 N.W.2d 758, 762
(1969)).
98. 645 N.W.2d 125, 137-40 (Minn. 2002) (Page, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 137.
100. Id. (quoting United States v. Beale, 736 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1984)
(Pregerson, J., dissenting)).
101. Id. at 138.
102. Id. (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001)).
103. Id.
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104

regardless of what the dog smelled.”
Moreover, the lack of a
105
physical intrusion does not make the dog sniff less intrusive.
Neither the infrared technology in Kyllo nor the eavesdropping in
106
Katz v. United States was permissible, even though neither involved
107
Like the sense-enhancing infrared
a physical invasion.
technology in Kyllo, “the sense-enhancing dog-sniff, not in general
public use, obtained information regarding the interior of the
vehicle that could not have been obtained without physical
intrusion—a physical intrusion that would otherwise require
108
probable cause.”
Justice Page concluded his special concurrence in Carter by
noting that the privacy interest in a storage unit is even greater
109
than the privacy interest in an automobile.
Given this privacy
interest and the fact that a dog sniff is an intrusive search, Justice
Page interpreted the Minnesota Constitution to require probable
cause before a dog sniff could be conducted around the exterior of
110
a vehicle.
C. The Dissent of Justice Russell Anderson
The lone dissenting voice was that of Justice Russell Anderson.
Noting that there was no reason to reject the analysis set forth in
United States v. Place, Justice Anderson argued that the use of a drugdetecting dog “outside Carter’s storage unit did not constitute a
search” because Carter did not have “a legitimate expectation of
111
privacy in the air outside the unit, in a semi-public walkway.”
Focusing on “[t]he area where the dog sniff was conducted,” Justice
Anderson noted that the area was accessible to other people, that
Carter could not restrict access to the area outside the unit, that
Carter was only at the unit periodically, and that Carter did not live
112
there.
Dog sniffs, even fallible ones, are “a limited intrusion,
revealing nothing else inside the structure that might implicate a
113
legitimate expectation of privacy.”
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 138 (Page, J., concurring).
Id. (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982)).
State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 212 (Minn. 2005) (Page, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 213-14 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 214.
Id.
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Justice Anderson’s dissent also relied on Caballes, noting that
because a dog sniff is limited to detecting the “presence of
contraband,” and “[b]ecause any interest in possessing contraband
is not one that society considers legitimate, a sense-enhancing
technique that only reveals the presence of contraband
114
‘compromises no legitimate privacy interest.’”
Quoting Caballes,
Justice Anderson noted:
Critical to [the Kyllo] decision was the fact that the device
was capable of detecting lawful activity—in that case
intimate details in a home. . . . The legitimate expectation
that information about perfectly lawful activity will remain
private is categorically distinguishable from [a person’s]
hopes or expectations concerning the nondetection of
115
contraband . . . .
Justice Anderson determined that even under the majority’s
rationale, he would have “conclud[ed] that the police had
reasonable suspicion to justify a dog sniff,” and would have
116
affirmed Carter’s conviction.
V. ANALYSIS
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Carter is
significant for several reasons. First, Carter clearly held that article
I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution provides broader
protection from government intrusions than does the Fourth
117
Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
Second, applying the
U.S. Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the court
found that a dog sniff of a storage unit is not a search under the
Federal Constitution—a question that has yet to be addressed by
118
the Supreme Court.
Third, Carter rejected the analysis that the
U.S. Supreme Court has applied to drug-detecting dog sniffs, which
focuses on the nature of the item sought, and concluded that a dog
sniff of a storage unit is a search under article I, section 10 of the
119
Minnesota Constitution.
Fourth, the Minnesota Supreme Court
refused to extend the rationale of Kyllo—the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision concerning the use of thermal imaging to “see” inside a
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005)).
Id. at 214-15 (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409-10).
Id. at 215.
Id. at 210 (majority opinion).
Id. at 207-09.
Id. at 208-11.
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120

home—to dog sniffs.
Fifth, the court clarified that the “plain
smell” doctrine does not apply to smells that are detected by
121
dogs.
And finally, Carter recognized that the potential for false
alerts from drug-detection dogs must be factored into the
122
constitutional analysis of this type of investigation.
Carter is certainly instructive about how the Minnesota
Supreme Court will approach the constitutionality of dog sniffs in
123
future cases.
But the decision will also have a broader impact.
Carter provides a unique framework for addressing government
intrusions under article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution,
bracing Minnesota search and seizure law for emerging law
enforcement technologies.
A. Expanding the Meaning of a “Search” Under Article I, Section 10
In Carter, the court took seriously its “responsibility as
Minnesota’s highest court to independently safeguard for the
people of Minnesota the protections embodied in [the state]
124
constitution.”
As the court noted, it is “free to offer protections
under the Minnesota Constitution that are greater than those
under the United States Constitution,” but will not “cavalierly” do
125
so.
While the court in several earlier decisions recognized that
Minnesota citizens’ protections against seizures may be greater
126
under the state constitution than the Federal Constitution, those
120. Id. at 207-08, 211.
121. Id. at 211.
122. Id. at 210.
123. See id. at 207-11.
124. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 362 (Minn. 2004).
125. Carter, 697 N.W.2d. at 210.
126. In 1993, the Minnesota Supreme Court declined to follow the U.S.
Supreme Court’s approach that a seizure occurs when police use physical force,
because it represented a “sharp departure” from Minnesota’s rule that a seizure
occurs when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. In re E.D.J., 502
N.W.2d 779, 780 (Minn. 1993) (discussing California v. Hodari, 449 U.S. 621
(1991)). In the following year, the Minnesota Supreme Court declined to follow
the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), that a police
roadblock to investigate drunk driving did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 185-86 (Minn. 1994)
(discussing Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990)). The court
decided that Sitz “represent[ed] a ‘radical’ departure from the way the [Terry
balancing] test has been and should be applied” to roadblocks. Id. at 186.
Instead, Ascher held that article I, section 10 required “objective individualized
articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing before subjecting a driver to an
investigative stop.” Id. at 187. Furthermore, in Askerooth, the court refused to
follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision that the Fourth Amendment does not
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decisions did not address whether those same protections applied
127
Carter makes clear that the Minnesota Constitution
to searches.
affords greater protections against unreasonable searches than
128
does the U.S. Constitution.
This expansion of the meaning of a search will likely have
important consequences outside of the dog sniff context.
Increasingly, technology is enhancing law enforcement’s ability to
conduct criminal investigations that involve minimal physical
129
intrusions.
Moreover, technology itself is driving the need for
new investigative techniques, as in the case of growing Internet
130
Novel law enforcement technologies—from sensesurveillance.
enhancing devices to computer surveillance tools—will likely
challenge the future boundaries of a search under article I, section
10 of the Minnesota Constitution.
B. The Nature of Privacy and the Degree of Intrusion Under the Fourth
Amendment
Carter decided that a dog sniff of a storage unit is not a search
131
Although
under the Federal Constitution’s Fourth Amendment.
the U.S. Supreme Court has not considered the constitutionality of
dog sniffs of storage units, its jurisprudence treats a dog sniff as a
132
constitutionally unique investigative technique. In Place, Edmond,
and Caballes, the Court explained that a dog sniff is minimally
intrusive because it entails no physical invasion and it does not
implicate a legitimate privacy interest—because a person cannot
133
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband.
In
prohibit the warrantless arrest of a person who has committed a misdemeanor,
concluding that “Atwater’s apparent removal of any consideration of a balancing of
individual interests with governmental interests troubles us because this removal is
in tension with a broad range of our precedent.” Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 362
(discussing Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001)).
127. See cases cited supra note 126.
128. Carter, 697 N.W.2d. at 210.
129. See Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth
Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1336-57
(2002) (discussing new law enforcement technologies).
130. See Geoffrey A. North, Carnivore in Cyberspace: Extending the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act’s Framework to Carnivore Surveillance, 28 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 155, 156-68 (2002) (discussing a government-created
surveillance device for policing internet activity).
131. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 202.
132. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005); City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
133. See cases cited supra note 132.
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Caballes, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not
require a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drugdetection dog on a car stopped during a legitimate traffic stop
because it “reveals no information other than the location of a
134
substance that no individual has any right to possess.”
Further,
the Court squarely stated that “[o]fficial conduct that does not
‘compromise any legitimate interest in privacy’ is not a search
subject to the Fourth Amendment,” and that “any interest in
135
possessing contraband cannot be deemed ‘legitimate.’”
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Carter was, of course,
136
constrained by the U.S. Supreme Court’s dog sniff precedent.
Thus, even if the privacy interest is greater for a storage unit than it
is for a car, the court recognized that under the Fourth
Amendment, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
137
Amendment protection,”
and while “a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in luggage contents . . . there is no such
expectation in scents that may be detected at the luggage’s
138
exterior.”
Turning to the intrusiveness of a dog sniff, the court noted the
sui generis nature of a dog sniff as articulated in Place, commenting
that there is “no other investigative procedure that is so limited
both in the manner in which the information is obtained and in
139
the content of the information revealed by the procedure.”
Further, the court noted that Caballes
emphasized its view that a drug-detection dog sniff is only
minimally intrusive, deciding that the dog sniff of a
134. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410.
135. Id. at 408 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984)).
136. See id. at 409; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40; Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
137. State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 207 (Minn. 2005) (quoting Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
138. Id. (citing Place, 462 U.S. at 707 n.4). In fact, there are good reasons why
a dog sniff of a place such as a storage unit or a home, not to mention a person,
might raise greater constitutional concerns. Carter’s reliance on Place and Caballes
in this context thus seems inadequate; Place’s focus on a traveler’s limited
expectation of privacy in luggage while in a public airport has limited applicability
to a person’s expectation of privacy in a storage unit, particularly when Minnesota
decisions already hold that under the Fourth Amendment a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in places such as a storage unit. See State v.
Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 254 (Minn. 2003); see also State v. Larsen, 650 N.W.2d 144,
148-49 (Minn. 2002) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in an ice-fishing
house).
139. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 207 (quoting Place, 462 U.S. at 707).
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vehicle lawfully seized on a public roadway “generally does
not implicate legitimate privacy interests” under the
Fourth Amendment because it “does not expose
noncontraband items that otherwise would remain
hidden from public view.”
The Court specifically
determined that Kyllo is “entirely consistent” with Place.
The Court observed that while a heat-sensory device is
“capable of detecting lawful activity” inside a house, a dog
sniff “reveals no information other than the location of a
substance that no individual has any right to possess.”
The Court clarified that the relevant inquiry is whether
the investigative device used is capable of detecting lawful
as well as unlawful activity inside a place that otherwise
140
carries a legitimate expectation of privacy.
Thus, under these cases, a drug-detection dog sniff in the area
immediately surrounding a storage unit is not a search under the
Fourth Amendment because a storage unit “is not a place where a
141
person seeks refuge or conducts frequent personal activities.”
As many commentators have observed, there are compelling
142
reasons to criticize the Supreme Court’s approach to dog sniffs.
For example, since Katz v. United States, it has been the law that the
reach of the Fourth Amendment “cannot turn upon the presence
or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure” and
that a physical invasion is not necessary to trigger constitutional
143
protections.
The Supreme Court’s focus on the nature of the
item sought, and its conclusion that there is no legitimate
expectation of privacy in contraband, is likewise constitutionally
144
unsound.
The nature of the place to be searched is the starting
140. Id. at 208 (internal citations omitted).
141. Id. at 209.
142. See, e.g., Richard E. Myers II, In the Wake of Caballes, Should We Let Sniffing
Dogs Lie?, 20 CRIM. JUST. 4 (2006) (criticizing the analysis of dog sniffs employed by
the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts of Appeals in the context of the Fourth
Amendment).
143. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34
(2001) (“We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information
regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained
without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ constitutes a
search.”) (internal citation omitted).
144. See Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927) (“A search prosecuted in
violation of the Constitution is not made lawful by what it brings to light.”); see also
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37 (“The Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home has never
been tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of information obtained.”);
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 415 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“As a general
proposition, using a dog to sniff for drugs is subject to the rule that the object of
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145

point of the search inquiry and an analysis that only looks to the
146
It has been repeatedly
nature of the item sought is insufficient.
observed that a canine sniff may be designed to detect limited
147
148
information, but it is still intrusive.
Thus, while Caballes “does
enforcing criminal laws does not, without more, justify suspicionless Fourth
Amendment intrusions.”).
145. See Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 206 (“The [Fourth Amendment] right arises only
when a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place in question”
(citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977))); see also O’Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) (plurality opinion) (“Because the reasonableness
of an expectation of privacy, as well as the appropriate standard for a search, is
understood to differ according to context, it is essential first to delineate the
boundaries of the [area searched].”).
146. A house or a storage unit carries greater privacy expectations than does a
car or luggage in an airport. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985)
(“Automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and continuing
governmental regulation and controls, including periodic inspection and licensing
requirements.”); see also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)
(commenting that a diminished expectation of privacy in a vehicle is justified
because “its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence or as
the repository of personal effects” (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590
(1974))). Similarly, a person has a lower expectation of privacy in an airport
because at an airport, people and luggage are subject to extensive scrutiny. See
State v. Martinson, 581 N.W.2d 846, 850 (Minn. 1998) (discussing the extensive
use of antihijacking surveillance and drug courier profiles at airports); see also
Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 6 (1984) (“[D]ue in part to extensive
antihijacking surveillance and equipment, reasonable privacy expectations are of
significantly lesser magnitude [in a major international airport.]” (quoting Florida
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 515 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))).
147. But see Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1017 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (dog
alerted to student who had been playing with her dog that was in heat).
148. Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Place explains that
a dog does more than merely allow the police to do more efficiently what
they could do using only their own senses. A dog adds a new and
previously unobtainable dimension to human perception. The use of
dogs, therefore, represents a greater intrusion into an individual’s
privacy. Such use implicates concerns that are at least as sensitive as
those implicated by the use of certain electronic detection devices.
462 U.S. 696, 719-20 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Similarly, New
Hampshire’s highest court noted:
Employing a trained canine to sniff a person’s private vehicle in order to
determine whether controlled substances are concealed inside is
certainly a search [within the terms of the New Hampshire Constitution].
The drug detection dog discerned something not otherwise apparent to
the officers through their own senses, aided or unaided, and advised
them of what the dog had discovered by means the officers could
perceive. The very purpose of bringing the dog to the vehicle was to
have it detect any contraband that might be hidden inside. The sniff, in
short, was a prying by officers into the contents of [the defendant’s]
possession, which, concealed as they were from public view, could not
have been evident to the officers before the prying began.
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not go so far as to say explicitly that sniff searches by dogs trained
to sense contraband always get a free pass under the Fourth
149
Amendment,” it is difficult to envision a circumstance under
which the Supreme Court would decide that a dog sniff—even of a
house or a person—ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment if the dog
sniff only detected the presence of contraband.
C. The Nature of Privacy and the Degree of Intrusion Under Article I,
Section 10
In Carter, the Minnesota Supreme Court used a strikingly
different approach in considering the privacy interest and degree
of intrusion under the Minnesota Constitution. First, the court
concluded that “a person’s expectation of privacy in a self-storage
unit is greater for the purpose of the Minnesota Constitution than
150
it has been determined to be under the Fourth Amendment,”
particularly for storage units like Carter’s “that are equivalent in
size to a garage and are large enough to contain a significant
number of personal items and even to conduct some personal
151
activities.”
Unlike a car or luggage, “the dominant purpose for
152
such a unit is to store personal effects in a fixed location.” While
the court cautioned that the expectation of privacy does not extend
to objects that can be plainly viewed or smelled, it clarified that a
smell in the area outside of a storage unit is “‘plain’ only if a person
153
is capable of detecting it.”
The court’s analysis of the degree of intrusiveness factor is
noteworthy—because there is almost no analysis at all. After
discussing the so-called “plain smell” doctrine, the court moved
State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710, 716 (N.H. 1990); see also United States v. Thomas,
757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir. 1985) (“[T]he officers’ use of a dog is not a mere
improvement of their sense of smell, as ordinary eyeglasses improve vision, but is a
significant enhancement accomplished by a different, and far superior, sensory
instrument.”); People v. Haley, 41 P.3d 666, 672 (Colo. 2001) (rejecting the
argument that a “dog merely enhances the olfactory senses of an officer” and
merely sniffs the air where the officer’s “sole purpose was to conduct a drug
investigation and to detect whether evidence hidden from view was within the
car”); State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 137 (Minn. 2002) (Page, J., concurring)
(concluding that dog-sniffs constitute a significant intrusion “requir[ing] probable
cause before the intrusion is permissible”).
149. 543 U.S. 405, 417 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
150. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 210.
151. Id. at 211.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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immediately to its conclusion that “the sniff of a drug-detection dog
outside appellant’s storage unit was a search for purposes of the
154
Minnesota Constitution.”
The court did not, for purposes of its
article I, section 10 analysis, rely on or even cite the Place, Edmond
or Caballes decisions and their discussion of the limited
intrusiveness of dog sniffs. It did not rest its decision on the
rationale of those cases that the dog detects only the presence or
absence of contraband, and does not physically invade the area.
Thus, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the Carter majority was
unwilling to focus its inquiry on the unlawful nature of the item
searched.
The court’s analysis under the Minnesota Constitution is a
sharp break from the Supreme Court’s approach to dog sniffs.
Under Carter, the specific context within which the dog sniff is
conducted, and the corresponding nature of the privacy interest in
the place being sniffed, appears to take precedence over the
limited nature of the intrusion presented by a dog sniff.
D. Limiting the Reach of Kyllo
In Kyllo, the Supreme Court held that the use of a thermalimaging device to detect the growth of marijuana in a home is a
search and thus presumptively invalid if conducted without a
155
warrant.
There are persuasive arguments that under Kyllo’s
rationale, a dog sniff is a search under the U.S. Constitution. As
one court noted:
Like the heat-detecting device in Kyllo, a dog’s nose is able
to detect the presence of drugs and explosives which
would be unknowable without physical intrusion. Neither
the device in Kyollo [sic] nor a dog’s nose injects anything
into the area of privacy; both are dependent upon
invisible elements—molecules or heat—emanating from
156
the place being investigated.
Just as thermal imagers “detect infrared radiation, which
virtually all objects emit but which is not visible to the naked eye,” a
trained canine unit detects odors that cannot be smelled by a
157
human nose. Dog sniffs, like the thermal-imaging scan, still allow
154. Id.
155. 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
156. United States v. Richard, No. 01-20048-01, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14104, at
*17 n.4. (W.D. La. Aug. 17, 2001) (italics added).
157. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29.
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police to obtain information about the interior of a protected place
“that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical
158
‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.’”
Finally, drugdetecting dogs implicate Kyllo’s concern for advancing technology
such as the “dog on a chip,”—a device that can smell microscopic
159
amounts of drugs, chemical agents, or even cancerous cells.
The United States and the Minnesota Supreme Courts,
however, have rejected the argument that thermal imaging and dog
sniffs are equivalents. It is evident that neither court is willing to
expand the applicability of Kyllo much beyond houses. In Caballes,
the Supreme Court declared that its holding there—that a dog sniff
of a car during a valid traffic stop does not implicate legitimate
160
privacy interests—was “entirely consistent” with Kyllo.
As in
Caballes, a critical aspect of the holding in Kyllo was “the fact that
the [thermal-imaging] device was capable of detecting lawful
activity—in that case, intimate details in a home, such as ‘at what
hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and
161
bath.’”
The Court considered this information about lawful
activity to be “categorically distinguishable” from “expectations
concerning the nondetection of contraband in the trunk of [a]
162
car.”
While the Court has not considered whether Kyllo would
change its analysis of a dog sniff of a storage unit or a house, the
logical extension of Place and Caballes is that, notwithstanding Kyllo,
unless the sniff can detect lawful activity, no legitimate expectation
of privacy is infringed.
Similarly, in the context of a storage unit, the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Carter reaffirmed its position first set forth in
163
164
165
Wiegand: Kyllo did not overrule Edmond or Place.
The court
rejected the argument that a drug-detecting dog is similar to the
166
“sense-enhancement technology . . . not in general public use.”
158. Id. at 34 (internal citation omitted).
159. See, e.g., CNN.com, Box to Replace Drug-Sniffing Canines?,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/ptech/11/21/dog.chip.ap (Nov. 22, 2003).
160. 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005).
161. Id. at 409-10 (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38).
162. Id. at 410.
163. State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125,130 (Minn. 2002).
164. 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000) (holding that a dog sniff of a vehicle at a traffic
checkpoint is not a search because it “does not require entry into the car and is
not designed to disclose any information other than the presence or absence of
narcotics”).
165. State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 207-08 (Minn. 2005).
166. Id. (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34).
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Carter clearly limits Kyllo’s analysis to the home—or at least to places
where “a person seeks refuge or conducts frequent personal
167
168
activities,” which would apparently include an ice-fishing house.
Under this standard, however, Carter’s expectation of privacy in his
storage unit, which as the court noted was “equivalent in size to a
garage and [was] large enough to contain a significant number of
169
personal items and even to conduct some personal activities”
could have implicated Kyllo. At least for now, however, Minnesota
courts following Carter will limit Kyllo to its facts—the use of a
thermal-imaging or similar device that can detect lawful activity in a
home or other places where “a person seeks refuge or conducts
frequent personal activities.”
E. Potential for False Alerts
In examining the question of whether there were “significant
reasons why the definition of a search should be broader” under
the state constitution than under the Federal Constitution, the
court looked to decisions of the Alaska and Pennsylvania courts for
guidance, both of which had held that a dog sniff of a storage unit
170
was a search under their respective state constitutions.
As to
these decisions, the court noted that “[t]hese courts relied in part
on persuasive arguments by Professor Wayne R. LaFave, who
cautions against ‘totally unrestrained’ use of dogs in law
enforcement because of the growing recognition that dogs can
171
The court’s citation of this factor—the
provide ‘false alerts.’”
potential error rates of drug-detecting dogs—from these decisions
is significant given that the issue of “false alerts” was not explicitly
before the court, although it may have been suggested by the fact
167. Id. at 209.
168. Id. (citing State v. Larsen, 650 N.W.2d 144, 149 (Minn. 2002), which held
that warrantless entry into an ice-fishing house violated the Fourth Amendment
because the structure is “erected and equipped to protect its occupants from the
elements and often provid[es] eating, sleeping and other facilities”).
169. Id. at 210-11; see also United States v. Dart, 747 F.2d 263, 265-67 (4th Cir.
1984) (finding defendant’s expectation of privacy in a rented storage unit
“analogous to the expectation of privacy he had in his home” where the unit was
located “in a fenced area,” had a “garage-like door that provided the only entrance
to the unit” and the unit “was secured with a lock for which only Dart had a key”).
170. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 210 (citing McGahan v. State, 807 P.2d 506, 510
(Alaska Ct. App. 1991); Commonwealth v. Johnston, 530 A.2d 74, 77-79 (Pa.
1987)).
171. Id. (citing 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1(e), at 315 (2d ed.
1987)); McGahan, 807 P.2d at 510-11 (citing 1 LAFAVE, § 2.2(f), at 372)).
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that no drugs were found when police searched Carter’s storage
unit the day after the dog indicated that there were drugs in the
172
unit.
The potential for false alerts is of growing concern to courts
and commentators. Justice Souter’s dissent in Caballes observed
that the “infallible dog”—the idea that canine sniffs detect nothing
but the presence of contraband that forms the basis for the
proposition that dog sniffs are sui generis and only present a limited
intrusion—“is a creature of legal fiction . . . whether owing to
errors by their handlers, the limitations of the dogs themselves, or
173
even the pervasive contamination of currency by cocaine.”
Justice Souter argued that once this fallibility is recognized, the
Place justification that sniffs are sui generis falls away, and the sniff
“conducted to obtain information about the contents of private
spaces beyond anything human senses could perceive . . . is the first
step in a process that may disclose ‘intimate details’ without
revealing contraband, just as a thermal-imaging device might do, as
174
described in Kyllo.”
Thus, Carter signaled its concern with the potential error rate
of dog sniffs, and an erroneous dog sniff—in particular one that
175
reveals “intimate details” of a private place.
This may be a
significant factor for the court in future cases.
F.

Limiting the “Plain Smell” Doctrine
Finally, Carter makes clear that the reach of the so-called “plain

172. See Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 204.
173. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 411-12. (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
Justice Souter cites a number of cases in support of his dissent. See, e.g., United
States v. $242,484.00, 351 F.3d 488, 511 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that because as
much as 80% of all currency in circulation contains drug residue, a dog alert “is of
little value”), vacated on other grounds by reh’g en banc, 357 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir.
2004); United States v. Limares, 269 F.3d 794, 797 (7th Cir. 2001) (accepting as
reliable a dog that gave false positives between 7 and 38% of the time); United
States v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371, 1378 (10th Cir. 1997) (describing a dog that had
a 71% accuracy rate); United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1378 n.3 (10th
Cir. 1997) (describing a dog that erroneously alerted four times out of nineteen
while working for the postal service and 8% of the time over its entire career);
United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1214-17 (3d Cir. 1994) (Becker, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (“[A] substantial portion of United States currency
. . . is tainted with sufficient traces of controlled substances to cause a trained
canine to alert to their presence.”); Laime v. State, 60 S.W.3d 464, 476 (Ark. 2001)
(speaking of a dog that made between ten and fifty errors).
174. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 412-13.
175. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 214 (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409-10).
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smell” doctrine does not extend to smells detectable by dogs.
Some courts have held that the warrant requirement exception for
smells that an officer can plainly detect includes smells detected by
176
a canine. This approach, however, has been criticized because in
those cases “none of the officers involved was able to detect the
odor of narcotics; the drugs were not in the plain smell of the
officers. The officers needed trained dogs to sniff out the
177
contraband.”
The Carter majority agreed with these commentators. The
court stated:
We are mindful that a person’s expectation of privacy in a
self-storage unit does not extend to that which can be
plainly seen or smelled from the area immediately outside
the unit. But we consider the smell of that area to be
“plain” only if a person is capable of detecting it. Stated
another way, a renter of such a unit must expect that
other people will lawfully be in the area outside the unit
and will be able to smell plain odors emanating from the
unit. But the renter need not expect that police will be
able to bring to that area drug-detecting dogs that can
detect odors that no person could detect. Such dogs do
not enable a police officer to smell the odor, but instead,
as in Kyllo, provide information to the police officer that
was “previously . . . unknowable without physical
178
intrusion.”
Thus, the court properly determined that there is nothing
plain about a smell that cannot be detected by the human nose.
In his dissent, Justice Russell Anderson expressed his concern
for the ramifications of the majority’s decision on “plain smell”
observations such as “the use of bomb-detection dogs to sniff for
176. See, e.g., United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 461 (2d Cir. 1975) (“If
the police officers here had detected the aroma of the drug through their own
olfactory senses, there could be no serious contention that their sniffing in the
area of the bags would be tantamount to an unlawful search. . . . We fail to
understand how the detection of the odoriferous drug by the use of the sensitive
and schooled canine senses here employed alters the situation and renders the
police procedure constitutionally suspect.”). See generally 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE § 2.2(g) (4th ed. 2004).
177. Max A. Hansen, Comment, United States v. Solis: Have the Government’s
Supersniffers Come Down with a Case of Constitutional Nasal Congestion?, 13 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 410, 423 (1976) (citing United States v. Solis, 393 F. Supp. 325, 327 (C.D.
Cal. 1975)); see also 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 2.2(g) (4th ed. 2004).
178. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 211 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S 27, 40
(2001)).
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explosives” and “humans detecting the odor of a decaying body or
179
But this concern is misplaced.
a methamphetamine laboratory.”
The majority was clear, as it was in Wiegand, that the decision was
specifically limited to sniffs of drug-detecting dogs, and did not
apply to bomb-detecting dogs “as to which the special needs of law
180
enforcement might well be significantly greater.”
Similarly, it
seems clear that smells detectable by humans, whether a
methamphetamine laboratory or a decaying body, would fall
outside of the Carter holding—precisely because they are smells
that can be detected by a human nose, and thus people “must
expect that other people will lawfully be in the area outside the
unit and will be able to smell plain odors emanating from the
181
unit.”
VI. CONCLUSION
Drug-detecting dog sniffs will continue to present challenges
to courts considering their constitutionality.
In Carter, the
Minnesota Supreme Court clearly signaled that the Minnesota
Constitution does not allow random and unrestrained use of
182
dogs, particularly in places that carry higher expectations of
privacy. The decision thus establishes important boundaries on the
future use of dog sniffs, as well as other kinds of law enforcement
investigatory techniques.

179. Id. at 215.
180. Id. at 211 n.8; see also State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 131 n.5 (Minn.
2002) (distinguishing the implications of that holding for drug-sniffing dogs from
the implications for “the accepted use of dogs to detect, for example, explosives”).
181. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 211.
182. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979). When an official lacks
either probable cause to believe a violation has occurred or other articulable basis
upon which a reasonable suspicion may be based before effectuating a search or
seizure, “[t]his kind of standardless and unconstrained discretion is the evil the
Court has discerned when in previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of
the official in the field be circumscribed, at least to some extent.” Id.
“Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in
the arsenal of every arbitrary government.” Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519
N.W.2d 183, 186 n.1 (Minn. 1994) (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
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